Your Honey, My Poison: Patronage, Promotion and Local Implementation in China

Why do policy priorities vary among Chinese localities? This study proposes a novel explanation centered on a dynamic political selection system with multiple tracks for career advancement. It argues that local leaders’ priorities are shaped by their decisions about whether to pursue the optimal selection track, namely the one supported by the patronage of the supreme leader. While most bureaucrats focus on “hard” policies (linked to strong performance indicators) to achieve satisfactory evaluations, prioritizing “soft” policies (with weaker indicators) can serve as a shortcut to accessing the optimal track. However, this path is less appealing for leaders with greater patronage distance, that is, those who are farther from the supreme leader’s network, as failing to join the network not only blocks access to the optimal track but also hinders merit-based promotion. An empirical study of 288 cities examines how patronage distance influences leaders’ commitment to implementing tax policy, SO₂ emissions reduction policy, and innovation policy. The findings provide strong support for the argument. This study contributes to our understanding of authoritarian political selection and local implementation.