Objectives <p>In this short report, we seek to replicate the work in Behlendorf and Wilson (Crime &amp; Delinquency 71(3):860–889, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2025</CitationRef>) and expand upon the generalizability of the deterrent value of the previously tested security layers from an aviation passenger environment to also incorporate port and rail passenger environments that are also under the purview of TSA and DHS.</p> Methods <p>We employ a similar method to Behlendorf and Wilson (Crime &amp; Delinquency 71(3):860–889, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2025</CitationRef>) with a national sample of individuals acting as red teamers and leveraging a paired choice conjoint design with randomly assigned security layers to uncover what security layers are (in)effective at displacing would-be attackers in multiple environments.</p> Results <p>We largely replicate the prior results of Behlendorf and Wilson (Crime &amp; Delinquency 71(3):860–889, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2025</CitationRef>) for the aviation passenger environment. We also find those security layers that deter in the aviation environment to also deter in both the port and rail environments. However, nearly all security layers are more deterring in the rail environment than in either the aviation or port passenger environments.</p> Conclusions <p>We interpret our results favoring differential deterrence by environment in light of reference dependence where individuals are liable to hold a lower reference point for security in rail as compared with port or aviation environments.</p>

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Report: visual deterrence in transportation security—a replication and extension

  • Theodore Wilson,
  • Brandon Behlendorf

摘要

Objectives

In this short report, we seek to replicate the work in Behlendorf and Wilson (Crime & Delinquency 71(3):860–889, 2025) and expand upon the generalizability of the deterrent value of the previously tested security layers from an aviation passenger environment to also incorporate port and rail passenger environments that are also under the purview of TSA and DHS.

Methods

We employ a similar method to Behlendorf and Wilson (Crime & Delinquency 71(3):860–889, 2025) with a national sample of individuals acting as red teamers and leveraging a paired choice conjoint design with randomly assigned security layers to uncover what security layers are (in)effective at displacing would-be attackers in multiple environments.

Results

We largely replicate the prior results of Behlendorf and Wilson (Crime & Delinquency 71(3):860–889, 2025) for the aviation passenger environment. We also find those security layers that deter in the aviation environment to also deter in both the port and rail environments. However, nearly all security layers are more deterring in the rail environment than in either the aviation or port passenger environments.

Conclusions

We interpret our results favoring differential deterrence by environment in light of reference dependence where individuals are liable to hold a lower reference point for security in rail as compared with port or aviation environments.