<p>Device-to-device (D2D) underlay communication has been considered as a promising technique due to its potential to enhance the spectrum efficiency in cellular networks. However, this comes at the cost of generating co-channel interference to cellular users (CUs). Recently, a few contributions showed that a D2D device can simultaneously act as a friendly jammer to enhance the secrecy of its underlaid CU against malicious eavesdroppers (EVs). To achieve this cooperation, a physical layer security perspective D2D resource allocation algorithm is carefully designed in this work. First, the investigation formulates an uplink resource allocation problem and investigate the quality of service (QoS) constraints of CUs, D2Ds, and eavesdroppers. Secondly, the investigation allocates channels according to the eavesdropper’s rate upper bounds to maximize the admissible D2D pairs while guaranteeing the QoS of both CUs and D2D links. Finally, numerical results show that our proposed secured interference filling (SIF) scheme can approach the secrecy probability of exhaustive searches while enjoying much less computational complexity.</p>

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Physical layer security perspective resource allocation for D2D underlay communications against multiple eavesdroppers

  • Yao-Jen Liang

摘要

Device-to-device (D2D) underlay communication has been considered as a promising technique due to its potential to enhance the spectrum efficiency in cellular networks. However, this comes at the cost of generating co-channel interference to cellular users (CUs). Recently, a few contributions showed that a D2D device can simultaneously act as a friendly jammer to enhance the secrecy of its underlaid CU against malicious eavesdroppers (EVs). To achieve this cooperation, a physical layer security perspective D2D resource allocation algorithm is carefully designed in this work. First, the investigation formulates an uplink resource allocation problem and investigate the quality of service (QoS) constraints of CUs, D2Ds, and eavesdroppers. Secondly, the investigation allocates channels according to the eavesdropper’s rate upper bounds to maximize the admissible D2D pairs while guaranteeing the QoS of both CUs and D2D links. Finally, numerical results show that our proposed secured interference filling (SIF) scheme can approach the secrecy probability of exhaustive searches while enjoying much less computational complexity.