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<p>Rainwater Harvesting (RWH) systems mitigate urban water scarcity but often trigger an institutional “water utility death spiral” by eroding revenue bases. This study develops a generalized collaborative framework based on cooperative game theory to reconcile the economic antagonism between decentralized RWH stakeholders and traditional water utilities. A synergistic cooperation mechanism is conceptualized, integrating the Non-potable Water Tariff (NT) and Investment Rate (IR) with government-led fiscal adjustments to transform zero-sum competition into a symbiotic alliance. The framework was empirically evaluated through a simulation study using high-resolution operational data from a campus in Japan. Technical evaluation indicates that the system achieves a 46% water-saving efficiency and 70.25% supply reliability. However, economic simulation reveals that in a non-cooperative scenario, RWH implementation leads to a 15-year cumulative profit loss of approximately 15.12&#xa0;million JPY for the local water plant. The results demonstrate that the cooperative gaming mechanisms facilitate a mutually beneficial equilibrium, enhancing financial returns for all stakeholders compared to non-cooperative baselines. This research provides a scalable theoretical template for municipal authorities to integrate distributed water-saving infrastructures into centralized urban management through balanced fiscal and tariff adjustments.</p>

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Economic Potential Analysis of Rainwater Harvesting System in Public Buildings with Introduction of Non-Potable Water Tariffs

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月6日

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  • Huayue Xie,
  • Weilun Chen,
  • Qinfeng Zhao,
  • Tian Wang,
  • Jiawei Gao,
  • Mengyuan Zhou,
  • Yingxiao Zhang,
  • Qingqing Liang,
  • Weijun Gao

摘要

Rainwater Harvesting (RWH) systems mitigate urban water scarcity but often trigger an institutional “water utility death spiral” by eroding revenue bases. This study develops a generalized collaborative framework based on cooperative game theory to reconcile the economic antagonism between decentralized RWH stakeholders and traditional water utilities. A synergistic cooperation mechanism is conceptualized, integrating the Non-potable Water Tariff (NT) and Investment Rate (IR) with government-led fiscal adjustments to transform zero-sum competition into a symbiotic alliance. The framework was empirically evaluated through a simulation study using high-resolution operational data from a campus in Japan. Technical evaluation indicates that the system achieves a 46% water-saving efficiency and 70.25% supply reliability. However, economic simulation reveals that in a non-cooperative scenario, RWH implementation leads to a 15-year cumulative profit loss of approximately 15.12 million JPY for the local water plant. The results demonstrate that the cooperative gaming mechanisms facilitate a mutually beneficial equilibrium, enhancing financial returns for all stakeholders compared to non-cooperative baselines. This research provides a scalable theoretical template for municipal authorities to integrate distributed water-saving infrastructures into centralized urban management through balanced fiscal and tariff adjustments.