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<p>In the face of intensifying climate extremes and global water scarcity, sustainable management depends critically on the cooperation between agriculture and mining—the two largest water-consuming sectors. Grounded in bounded rationality and externality theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game framework to model the strategic interactions among agriculture, mining, and government. We employ Delay Differential Equations (DDE) to capture realistic decision-making lags in infrastructure investment and technology adoption, contrasting these with traditional Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) models. Our analysis reveals that under purely market-driven mechanisms, optimal cooperation fails to emerge spontaneously due to positive externalities and information asymmetry. Government intervention is thus essential to steer the system toward a socially optimal equilibrium. Numerical simulations demonstrate that successful cooperation depends on a critical threshold of initial willingness (0.4–0.5) and is significantly sensitive to the ecological benefit coefficient and water conservation costs. Notably, the DDE model uncovers a “policy commitment” dynamic, showing that premature subsidy withdrawal can trigger strategic reversal—a phenomenon invisible in static models. Based on these findings, we recommend implementing dynamic subsidy-penalty mechanisms, lowering initial participation barriers, and internalizing ecological values into pricing structures. By integrating water quantity and quality dimensions within a unified game structure, this study offers theoretical insights and actionable policy tools for fostering adaptive water governance in resource-depleted regions.</p>

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Crisis and Cooperation Under Water Resource Depletion: an Evolutionary Game Framework Involving Agriculture, Mining, and Government

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月16日

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  • Zhaofa Sun,
  • Junhua Guo

摘要

In the face of intensifying climate extremes and global water scarcity, sustainable management depends critically on the cooperation between agriculture and mining—the two largest water-consuming sectors. Grounded in bounded rationality and externality theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game framework to model the strategic interactions among agriculture, mining, and government. We employ Delay Differential Equations (DDE) to capture realistic decision-making lags in infrastructure investment and technology adoption, contrasting these with traditional Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) models. Our analysis reveals that under purely market-driven mechanisms, optimal cooperation fails to emerge spontaneously due to positive externalities and information asymmetry. Government intervention is thus essential to steer the system toward a socially optimal equilibrium. Numerical simulations demonstrate that successful cooperation depends on a critical threshold of initial willingness (0.4–0.5) and is significantly sensitive to the ecological benefit coefficient and water conservation costs. Notably, the DDE model uncovers a “policy commitment” dynamic, showing that premature subsidy withdrawal can trigger strategic reversal—a phenomenon invisible in static models. Based on these findings, we recommend implementing dynamic subsidy-penalty mechanisms, lowering initial participation barriers, and internalizing ecological values into pricing structures. By integrating water quantity and quality dimensions within a unified game structure, this study offers theoretical insights and actionable policy tools for fostering adaptive water governance in resource-depleted regions.