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<p>This article explores a dialogue between Buddhist and Wittgensteinian thought to propose a non-foundational, therapeutic epistemology for the philosophy of religion. Drawing on Madhyamaka analyses of <i>dṛṣṭi</i> (views), emptiness, and dependent origination, together with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on pictures, belief, and certainty, it argues that the root of suffering lies in structured habits of mind and language rather than in a lack of justified knowledge. Epistemic transformation is therefore inseparable from ethical transformation: knowing is sought not to secure theoretical foundations, but to loosen the grip of distorted frameworks that sustain attachment and delusion. In both Madhyamaka and Wittgenstein, philosophy functions as a practice of clarification, not a system of doctrines. The paper shows how Candrakīrti’s account of conventional truth operates as a method for de-reifying experience within everyday life, much as Wittgenstein’s grammatical therapy dissolves conceptual entanglement. Madhyamaka does not substitute one ground for another, but redefines the epistemic aim itself: liberation lies in perceiving the world without clinging to any view as ultimately real. This model invites a reconceptualization of religious epistemology that neither presupposes theistic commitments nor collapses into secular reductionism, opening instead toward cross-cultural, experientially engaged, and methodologically plural forms of reflection within the philosophy of religion.</p>

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When Rivers are Just Rivers: A Buddhist-Wittgensteinian Framework for a Non-Foundational Epistemology

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月12日

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  • Tomaso Pignocchi

摘要

This article explores a dialogue between Buddhist and Wittgensteinian thought to propose a non-foundational, therapeutic epistemology for the philosophy of religion. Drawing on Madhyamaka analyses of dṛṣṭi (views), emptiness, and dependent origination, together with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on pictures, belief, and certainty, it argues that the root of suffering lies in structured habits of mind and language rather than in a lack of justified knowledge. Epistemic transformation is therefore inseparable from ethical transformation: knowing is sought not to secure theoretical foundations, but to loosen the grip of distorted frameworks that sustain attachment and delusion. In both Madhyamaka and Wittgenstein, philosophy functions as a practice of clarification, not a system of doctrines. The paper shows how Candrakīrti’s account of conventional truth operates as a method for de-reifying experience within everyday life, much as Wittgenstein’s grammatical therapy dissolves conceptual entanglement. Madhyamaka does not substitute one ground for another, but redefines the epistemic aim itself: liberation lies in perceiving the world without clinging to any view as ultimately real. This model invites a reconceptualization of religious epistemology that neither presupposes theistic commitments nor collapses into secular reductionism, opening instead toward cross-cultural, experientially engaged, and methodologically plural forms of reflection within the philosophy of religion.