<p>Suppose it were possible to improve people’s ability to identify fake political news and resist common manipulative techniques, without at the same time interfering with their free speech rights. Suppose such improvements were easy to implement at scale on the most important social media platforms. It seems that doing so would obviously be morally permissible and, arguably, morally required. A number of real-world anti-misinformation interventions (from fact-checks to accuracy nudges) developed by psychologists in recent years appear to have just these features. They are mostly unobtrusive and non-censorial, moderately effective at improving our ability to spot fake news and resist manipulation, and they positively impact news sharing behavior. It is also feasible to implement them at scale. In this paper, I argue that, even if the counterstrategies to the spread of misinformation are as successful as their advocates claim, they are nevertheless morally questionable in important respects. Specifically, pursuing (a subset of) such strategies wrongs social media users by reducing their welfare, and all the interventions considered in the paper are <i>prima facie</i> disrespectful. These concerns suggest that the interventions’ all-things-considered justification hinges on whether their benefits outweigh these considerations. It is often maintained that they unquestionably do: the interventions help prevent serious harms to democratic institutions. However, significant empirical evidence undercuts this justification of the interventions. Overall, the paper’s arguments suggest that implementing effective anti-misinformation interventions implicates moral issues—such as harm and disrespect to the recipients—which seem important for our assessment of the merits of the strategy, but remain largely absent in the philosophical literature on the topic, focused, understandably, on the epistemically best responses to the problem.</p>