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<p>I defend an Austinian account of derogatory speech acts that distinguishes their general effects from their specific function – those that the being in force of their defining constitutive rules is meant to achieve. Derogatory acts are acts that put down the people they target as unworthy. On my view, slurs and pejoratives conventionally function to derogate by presupposing <i>contempt</i> for their targets on account of generic traits that presumably warrant derogation. This is also the view advanced by Marques and García-Carpintero (Grazer Philos Stud&#xa0;97(1):138–158, 2020). The view requires contexts to be structured not only by commitments to mutually shared beliefs, questions under discussion, and plans, but also to shared affective states. The main contribution of the present paper is an account of how shared commitments to affective attitudes can update conversational contexts.</p>

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The Constitutive Function of Derogation

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月8日

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  • Teresa Marques

摘要

I defend an Austinian account of derogatory speech acts that distinguishes their general effects from their specific function – those that the being in force of their defining constitutive rules is meant to achieve. Derogatory acts are acts that put down the people they target as unworthy. On my view, slurs and pejoratives conventionally function to derogate by presupposing contempt for their targets on account of generic traits that presumably warrant derogation. This is also the view advanced by Marques and García-Carpintero (Grazer Philos Stud 97(1):138–158, 2020). The view requires contexts to be structured not only by commitments to mutually shared beliefs, questions under discussion, and plans, but also to shared affective states. The main contribution of the present paper is an account of how shared commitments to affective attitudes can update conversational contexts.