<p>This paper challenges the dualism between individualist and structuralist accounts of discrimination by offering a Hegelian analysis of bias as habit. It argues that a division between individual and structural factors obscures the deeply interdependent nature of individual agency and structural context. Drawing on Hegel’s philosophy – especially his conceptions of habit (<i>Gewohnheit</i>), ethical life (<i>Sittlichkeit</i>), and practical freedom – we develop a framework in which biases understood as habits are not merely individual mental states but embodied and embedded enactments of social norms. Habits, we argue, are both expressive of individual agency and constitutive of the structures within which that agency unfolds. This reconceptualization allows us to understand discriminatory behavior not as unconscious belief or isolated action, but as a habitual way of acting that fits seamlessly within unjust social structures – and thus often remains unnoticed or perceived as unproblematic by the acting agent. In this light, implicit bias is less about internal mental states and more about the implicit reproduction of structural inequality through habitual action. This Hegelian perspective reframes the discussion on bias interventions and social change: it highlights the need to attend to how individuals inhabit social norms and structures.</p>