<p>The Simulation Hypothesis, prominently advanced by Bostrom and Chalmers, posits that our reality may be a sophisticated computational simulation, rendering traditional distinctions between the living and the artificial or between persons and machines, mere artifacts of digital code. This paper examines the ontological, epistemic, and ethical implications of this hypothesis, particularly its challenge to conventional notions of reality. Assuming the Simulation Hypothesis holds, all entities—humans, non-human animals, and advanced artificial intelligences—are fundamentally instantiated as digital objects sharing a common ontological status. A central question arises: does this ontological uniformity necessitate ethical unity, or can meaningful ethical diversity persist among simulated beings? This paper argues that ethical diversity is possible despite ontological uniformity. Drawing on the frameworks of Virtual Realism, its radical variant Virtual Digitalism, and the concept of the digital object, it examines how ethical status can vary within a simulated reality. Key to this analysis is the problem of epistemic ignorance, which constrains ethical reasoning and gives rise to two primary perspectives: the Simulator Perspective and the Creature Perspective. From these, the paper derives two governing principles—the Principle of Non-harm and the Principle of Universal Reciprocity—to guide ethics in virtual worlds. The discussion further distinguishes between Intra-Simulation and Inter-simulation, and, through analyzing cases, it illustrates ethical diversity, formalizes the resulting moral dilemmas, and proposes a resolution centered on the moral responsibility of the simulator. Ultimately, this paper advocates a paradigm shift in metaphysical and ethical thinking to accommodate the possibilities of simulated existence.</p>