<p>This article explores the rhetorical structure of self-persuasion, a phenomenon often overlooked in both rhetorical theory and philosophy of language. Drawing on classical sources – most notably Aristotle – the paper situates self-deliberation within the tradition of rhetorical anthropology, interpreting internal dialogue not as a transparent form of rationality but as a field of persuasive conflict. In contrast to prevailing psychological accounts that neglect the linguistic dimension, the article employs Vygotsky’s theory of inner speech to frame self-persuasion as a verbally mediated form of practical reasoning. The central claim is that internal rhetoric plays a constitutive role in human agency: to persuade oneself is to be moved to act by one’s own words. Building on this, the paper outlines a typology of inner discourse that mirrors the three classical rhetorical genres – deliberative, judicial, and epideictic – while acknowledging the genre-blurring and fragmentary nature of endophasia. The final sections examine how the Aristotelian triad of <i>ethos</i>, <i>pathos</i>, and <i>logos</i> operates in self-directed persuasion, suggesting that emotional and ethical dimensions are especially salient. By reframing self-persuasion as a fully rhetorical phenomenon, the article argues that rhetorical theory must take seriously not only how we persuade others, but also how we shape our own beliefs, decisions, and character through language.</p>