<p>In the rapidly evolving field of artificial intelligence, virtual digital humans have emerged as powerful agents that blend digital simulation with human-like behaviors. This study evaluates how people perceive the moral status of virtual digital humans, rather than claiming their actual moral status. Specifically, we compare attributions of mind perception, free will, autonomy, and overall moral status among humans, virtual digital humans, and robots. Our findings show that while humans are widely regarded as complete moral agents and robots as having limited moral agency, virtual digital humans occupy an intermediate position—perceived as possessing partial yet incomplete moral agency. In particular, mind perception and free will are strong predictors of moral status, with autonomy also contributing though to a lesser extent. Mediation analyses confirm that these psychological factors either partially or fully explain the observed differences in moral status evaluations across groups. The study extends the discourse in moral philosophy by demonstrating how emerging digital entities are evaluated through public attributions ethically and by providing empirical input to the governance of them. These insights bear significant implications for public policy, industry practices, and interdisciplinary research in ethics and artificial intelligence.</p>