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<p>In this article, I examine Davidson’s surprising argument, in his John Locke Lectures, that <i>speaking the truth</i> is what he calls an essentially disengaged act. I show he defends in these lectures a type of semantic conventionalism, and how he took this conventionalism to entail the essentially disengaged character of speaking the truth. I then show how his characterization of the Principle of Charity, in those lectures themselves, suggests a powerful argument against the essentially disengaged character of speaking the truth, and, thus, against semantic conventionalism. Finally, I examine how he could have failed to notice this in the lectures by examining his changing picture of communication and the role the Principle of Charity plays in such exchanges.</p>

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Speaking the Truth, Conventions, and the Principle of Charity

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月6日

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  • Daniel Arvage Nagase

摘要

In this article, I examine Davidson’s surprising argument, in his John Locke Lectures, that speaking the truth is what he calls an essentially disengaged act. I show he defends in these lectures a type of semantic conventionalism, and how he took this conventionalism to entail the essentially disengaged character of speaking the truth. I then show how his characterization of the Principle of Charity, in those lectures themselves, suggests a powerful argument against the essentially disengaged character of speaking the truth, and, thus, against semantic conventionalism. Finally, I examine how he could have failed to notice this in the lectures by examining his changing picture of communication and the role the Principle of Charity plays in such exchanges.