<p>While the principle of charity in the philosophy of language primarily aims to promote understanding, its central role in argumentation theory is to guide the reconstruction of arguments. In this paper, I propose a competence-based approach to address the limitations of existing approaches to the principle of charity. This approach interprets the principle of charity as an effort to strengthen an argument based on the analyst’s conception of the arguer as possessing greater argumentative competence than the original presentation suggests. I argue that this approach not only clearly distinguishes the principle of charity from the principle of fidelity—by emphasizing their distinct focuses—but also preserves the link between the reconstructed argument and the arguer. Furthermore, it reframes existing approaches as reflecting the analyst’s different conceptions of the arguer’s competence, while also identifying an additional level of competence that deserves recognition. Collectively, this approach works towards providing a more practical framework for reconstructing arguments under the principle of charity.</p>