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<p>This article investigates the philosophical legacy of <i>synderesis</i>—an ancient concept referring to the innate and universal capacity of the soul to perceive the first principles of moral law—and explores its conceptual afterlife in two distinct strands of contemporary moral intuitionism. While the term has largely vanished from modern discourse, the problem it addressed—how human beings access moral truth immediately, without inferential mediation—persists in both rationalist and naturalist accounts of moral judgment. The first part reconstructs the medieval structure of <i>synderesis</i> as a non-discursive moral orientation grounded in practical reason, distinct from conscience but inseparable from it. The second part examines two modern reconceptualizations of moral intuition: one, intellectualist and non-naturalist, exemplified by W. D. Ross and later intuitionists; the other, emotion-based and naturalized, including empirical theories such as Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model and normatively proposals like Leon Kass’s defence of moral disgust. The article also discusses Martha Nussbaum’s critique of the normative use of disgust and considers recent empirical findings on its plasticity. In conclusion, the paper argues for a pluralist view in which moral intuition—whether rational or affective—can be integrated into normative ethics not as a foundation for justification, but as a source of motivational and epistemic support for deliberative moral reasoning.</p>

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Synderesis and the Varieties of Intuition: Toward a Genealogy of Immediate Moral Judgment

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月5日

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  • Andrea Lavazza,
  • Marialucrezia Leone

摘要

This article investigates the philosophical legacy of synderesis—an ancient concept referring to the innate and universal capacity of the soul to perceive the first principles of moral law—and explores its conceptual afterlife in two distinct strands of contemporary moral intuitionism. While the term has largely vanished from modern discourse, the problem it addressed—how human beings access moral truth immediately, without inferential mediation—persists in both rationalist and naturalist accounts of moral judgment. The first part reconstructs the medieval structure of synderesis as a non-discursive moral orientation grounded in practical reason, distinct from conscience but inseparable from it. The second part examines two modern reconceptualizations of moral intuition: one, intellectualist and non-naturalist, exemplified by W. D. Ross and later intuitionists; the other, emotion-based and naturalized, including empirical theories such as Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model and normatively proposals like Leon Kass’s defence of moral disgust. The article also discusses Martha Nussbaum’s critique of the normative use of disgust and considers recent empirical findings on its plasticity. In conclusion, the paper argues for a pluralist view in which moral intuition—whether rational or affective—can be integrated into normative ethics not as a foundation for justification, but as a source of motivational and epistemic support for deliberative moral reasoning.