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<p>How a theory (or a part thereof) begins affects how it develops, and so we start at the roots of the <i>Informal Logic</i> discussions over the Principle of Charity and look at the contributions made in the exchanges between Ralph Johnson (1981) and Trudy Govier (1981). As valuable as the insights of these two theorists are, they include two assumptions that we find problematic. Johnson organizes his account of Charity by drawing from Michael Scriven’s (1976) treatment and identifying the issue as finding the “best possible interpretation.” This raises the serious question of whose terms are used in making such a <i>best interpretation</i>. Or, best for whom? In the etic/emic debate surrounding the anthropological approach to argument, this is an important question to address. Govier disagrees with Johnson and approaches the issue from the direction of determining the best <i>argument.</i> The assumption here is that a common understanding of “argument” will underly all situations in which charity is required. Grounding our understanding of Charity in Aristotle’s discussion of goodwill (<i>eunoia</i>) in the <i>Rhetoric</i>, we ask what charity must look like in an <i>emic</i> environment characterizing so much cross-cultural argumentation; and we do so in relation to the problem of deep disagreement as introduced by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005) and developed by cross-cultural argumentation scholars.</p>

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Charity Begins Elsewhere

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月18日

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  • Daniel Mejía S.,
  • Christopher W. Tindale

摘要

How a theory (or a part thereof) begins affects how it develops, and so we start at the roots of the Informal Logic discussions over the Principle of Charity and look at the contributions made in the exchanges between Ralph Johnson (1981) and Trudy Govier (1981). As valuable as the insights of these two theorists are, they include two assumptions that we find problematic. Johnson organizes his account of Charity by drawing from Michael Scriven’s (1976) treatment and identifying the issue as finding the “best possible interpretation.” This raises the serious question of whose terms are used in making such a best interpretation. Or, best for whom? In the etic/emic debate surrounding the anthropological approach to argument, this is an important question to address. Govier disagrees with Johnson and approaches the issue from the direction of determining the best argument. The assumption here is that a common understanding of “argument” will underly all situations in which charity is required. Grounding our understanding of Charity in Aristotle’s discussion of goodwill (eunoia) in the Rhetoric, we ask what charity must look like in an emic environment characterizing so much cross-cultural argumentation; and we do so in relation to the problem of deep disagreement as introduced by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005) and developed by cross-cultural argumentation scholars.