<p>Charity is regularly taken to be symmetrical between speakers in an argument. However, we ask whether charity can be a reflexive and transitive relation. We argue here that charity must be reflexive, as one must be charitable with oneself, but this yields a difficulty in cases of disagreement in symmetric and transitive relations. This is what we call <i>the Peirce Problem</i> – that errors of reasoning are most easily seen in others, not in oneself. Calls for charity and criticisms of others for being uncharitable, then, are distinctive opportunities for this particular meta-argumentative pathology, as they are occasions for errors when we argue about arguments, for instance, when we argue about arguments that criticize our own arguments. When one is charitable with one’s own views, then others who critically challenge those views must, one is tempted to reason, have uncharitably interpreted them or are uncharitably criticizing them. This, ironically, is a failure of charitably interpreting criticism. Given reflexive charity, however, this is an inevitable tension with symmetric and transitive charity. So, one’s defaults are (pathologically) set on interpreting critics as having missed own’s own deeper points in their criticisms. Thus, the norms of charity when addressing agreeing others about criticism of shared views, we hold, yield a distinct meta-argumentative pathology.</p>