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<p>The Principle of Charity (PoC) instructs interpreters to resolve interpretative uncertainty by presuming the speaker’s rationality. This article examines PoC’s conversational applications and outlines a preliminary dialectical framework. It identifies four key aspects for a systematic study of PoC: (1) objects, (2) triggers, (3) dialectical consequences, and (4) broader normative considerations. First, it argues that PoC applies not only to utterances and inferences but also to questions—raising the issue of what it means to interpret a question charitably. Second, it shows that PoC can be triggered not only by interpretative dilemmas but also by epistemic uncertainty (How plausible is <i>P</i>?), opening the door to exploring epistemic charity—closely related to, but distinct from, interpretative PoC. Third, the analysis reveals that PoC can lead to varied dialectical responses—such as premature concessions, assumptions of the (global) burden of proof, or charitable criticisms—and that PoC is dialectically underdetermined: the same move may be either charitable or uncharitable, depending on the underlying interpretations and assessments. This challenges the common view that PoC entails a specific kind of criticism. Finally, while PoC can foster mutual trust and demonstrate dialectical virtues, it also has risks: it may encourage premature concessions, obscure common ground, reinforce social inequalities, or legitimize implausible views and dishonest speakers. Accordingly, PoC should be applied cautiously and assessed case by case.</p>

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Applying Charity in Discussion: The Path of a Charitable Opponent

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月28日

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  • Petar Bodlović

摘要

The Principle of Charity (PoC) instructs interpreters to resolve interpretative uncertainty by presuming the speaker’s rationality. This article examines PoC’s conversational applications and outlines a preliminary dialectical framework. It identifies four key aspects for a systematic study of PoC: (1) objects, (2) triggers, (3) dialectical consequences, and (4) broader normative considerations. First, it argues that PoC applies not only to utterances and inferences but also to questions—raising the issue of what it means to interpret a question charitably. Second, it shows that PoC can be triggered not only by interpretative dilemmas but also by epistemic uncertainty (How plausible is P?), opening the door to exploring epistemic charity—closely related to, but distinct from, interpretative PoC. Third, the analysis reveals that PoC can lead to varied dialectical responses—such as premature concessions, assumptions of the (global) burden of proof, or charitable criticisms—and that PoC is dialectically underdetermined: the same move may be either charitable or uncharitable, depending on the underlying interpretations and assessments. This challenges the common view that PoC entails a specific kind of criticism. Finally, while PoC can foster mutual trust and demonstrate dialectical virtues, it also has risks: it may encourage premature concessions, obscure common ground, reinforce social inequalities, or legitimize implausible views and dishonest speakers. Accordingly, PoC should be applied cautiously and assessed case by case.