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<p>Introspection is often conceptualized as a “purely inner” activity, whereby the introspector temporarily breaks their coupling with the external world to focus on their “inner world”. We offer a substantially different picture of introspection. Inspired by radically embodied cognitive science, we argue that introspective processes delivering substantial self-knowledge consist of embodied, world-involving activities wherein the introspector remains coupled with the world in specific, controlled ways. Our argument unfolds as follows: after a brief introduction (Sect.&#xa0;1), we provide a minimal account of introspection (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec2">2</InternalRef>) followed by a brief introduction to radically embodied views of the mind (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec3">3</InternalRef>). Then, in Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec4">4</InternalRef>, we present in detail a case of radical embodied introspection (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec5">4.1</InternalRef>); we argue that that case is indeed a case of introspection (Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec6">4.2</InternalRef>), and finally we defend our claim from some foreseeable objections (Sect.&#xa0; <InternalRef RefID="Sec7">4.3</InternalRef>). In Sect.&#xa0;5 we offer other examples, showing that radically embodied introspection is a widespread and varied phenomenon. Lastly, Sect.&#xa0;<InternalRef RefID="Sec9">6</InternalRef> concludes the paper sketching some morals to be drawn from our examples. The appendix briefly situates our view in the broader epistemological landscape.</p>

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Radically Embodied Introspection

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月9日

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  • Marco Facchin,
  • Zuzanna Rucińska,
  • Thomas Fondelli

摘要

Introspection is often conceptualized as a “purely inner” activity, whereby the introspector temporarily breaks their coupling with the external world to focus on their “inner world”. We offer a substantially different picture of introspection. Inspired by radically embodied cognitive science, we argue that introspective processes delivering substantial self-knowledge consist of embodied, world-involving activities wherein the introspector remains coupled with the world in specific, controlled ways. Our argument unfolds as follows: after a brief introduction (Sect. 1), we provide a minimal account of introspection (Sect. 2) followed by a brief introduction to radically embodied views of the mind (Sect. 3). Then, in Sect. 4, we present in detail a case of radical embodied introspection (Sect. 4.1); we argue that that case is indeed a case of introspection (Sect. 4.2), and finally we defend our claim from some foreseeable objections (Sect.  4.3). In Sect. 5 we offer other examples, showing that radically embodied introspection is a widespread and varied phenomenon. Lastly, Sect. 6 concludes the paper sketching some morals to be drawn from our examples. The appendix briefly situates our view in the broader epistemological landscape.