<p>Philosophy of mind and cognition, radical embodied cognition not excluded, has missed the descriptive mark by abstracting away from race, gender, (dis)ability and similar social realities in understanding human cognition. Correcting this requires doing better in the future, but also examining how we went so wrong to begin with. It involves not only adding these realities to our current ways of theorizing and stirring, but also fundamentally rethinking those ways. Building on the work of feminist philosopher of science Helen Longino, decolonial scholar Ramón Grosfoguel and critical race theorist Charles Mills, I argue that we should make visible and re-evaluate the background assumptions guiding theory construction in radical embodied cognition, particularly a preference for the universal characteristic of modern Western thought in general. I propose a conceptual shift towards radical embodied cognition as non-ideal theory. Only then will the field be optimally positioned to study the cognitive processes of human beings as they actually are ‘in the wild’: differently located in intersecting social hierarchies. One consequence is that we should not abstract away from the realities of race, gender, et cetera in formulating accounts of human cognition unless it is defended that these realities can be safely abstracted away from.</p>