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<p>It is an open question whether and in what sense non-linguistic animals are capable of cognitive acts that have logical content, and of how explicitly codified deduction systems like those of classical logic might relate to whatever sort of cognition non-human animals <i>are</i> capable of. In this essay, I show that a practical capacity for accepting and rejecting cognitive acts accounts for the possibility of cognition having logical <i>structure</i> but not <i>content</i>. On this basis, I hypothesize that the ability to engage in such self-directed cognitive acts is an evolutionary bridge linking simpler non-human and linguistic human cognition. Relating the proposal to bilateral proof systems, I show that a <i>unilateral</i> account of logical deduction systems – specified in terms of acceptance alone, and where logical operations are accounted for in terms of content rather than structure – would be more parsimonious in communicating about and propagating the rules of such systems. This provides a plausible explanation for why logical instruction would occur in unilateral acceptance-based rather than bilateral frameworks today even if, in the etiology of these capacities, bilateral structure-inducing modes of logical thinking antedate unilateral content-inducing modes.</p>

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Rejection as a Ground of Our Obedience to the Rules of Logic

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月9日

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  • Preston Stovall

摘要

It is an open question whether and in what sense non-linguistic animals are capable of cognitive acts that have logical content, and of how explicitly codified deduction systems like those of classical logic might relate to whatever sort of cognition non-human animals are capable of. In this essay, I show that a practical capacity for accepting and rejecting cognitive acts accounts for the possibility of cognition having logical structure but not content. On this basis, I hypothesize that the ability to engage in such self-directed cognitive acts is an evolutionary bridge linking simpler non-human and linguistic human cognition. Relating the proposal to bilateral proof systems, I show that a unilateral account of logical deduction systems – specified in terms of acceptance alone, and where logical operations are accounted for in terms of content rather than structure – would be more parsimonious in communicating about and propagating the rules of such systems. This provides a plausible explanation for why logical instruction would occur in unilateral acceptance-based rather than bilateral frameworks today even if, in the etiology of these capacities, bilateral structure-inducing modes of logical thinking antedate unilateral content-inducing modes.