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<p>Consider two principles of rational decision making. One says that you should never use the value of events that are inconsistent with your evidence to assess what to do. The other says that, if you know what a more informed version of yourself would do, then you should already do likewise with your current information. We show that no decision theory which agrees with evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) whenever they agree can satisfy both principles. In particular, assuming that agents update via Bayesian conditioning, EDT satisfies the former and violates the latter, while CDT violates the former and satisfies the latter. We show that the causalist can satisfy the first (at the cost of then violating the second) if she either uses a learning rule that changes her beliefs about counterfactuals in a particular way or uses a decision rule more in line with a rule proposed by Hitchcock (2016). We then employ these results to illuminate a core tension at the heart of the debate between evidentialists and causalists.</p>

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Deference and decision

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月2日

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  • Daniel A. Herrmann,
  • Gerard J. Rothfus

摘要

Consider two principles of rational decision making. One says that you should never use the value of events that are inconsistent with your evidence to assess what to do. The other says that, if you know what a more informed version of yourself would do, then you should already do likewise with your current information. We show that no decision theory which agrees with evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) whenever they agree can satisfy both principles. In particular, assuming that agents update via Bayesian conditioning, EDT satisfies the former and violates the latter, while CDT violates the former and satisfies the latter. We show that the causalist can satisfy the first (at the cost of then violating the second) if she either uses a learning rule that changes her beliefs about counterfactuals in a particular way or uses a decision rule more in line with a rule proposed by Hitchcock (2016). We then employ these results to illuminate a core tension at the heart of the debate between evidentialists and causalists.