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<p>How does present bias affect the propensity to forgive or punish? To explore this question, we employ quasi-hyperbolic discounting within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The primary results from theoretical and simulation studies demonstrate that present bias impedes the sustainability of forgiving or lenient strategies (e.g., Tit-for-Tat with or without additional forgiveness, and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift) in a Nash equilibrium. However, this bias does not significantly impact the likelihood of sustaining cooperation for punitive strategies (e.g., the grim trigger).</p>

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Forgiveness, cooperation, and present bias in the infinitely iterated Prisoner’s dilemma

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月3日

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  • Minwook Kang

摘要

How does present bias affect the propensity to forgive or punish? To explore this question, we employ quasi-hyperbolic discounting within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The primary results from theoretical and simulation studies demonstrate that present bias impedes the sustainability of forgiving or lenient strategies (e.g., Tit-for-Tat with or without additional forgiveness, and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift) in a Nash equilibrium. However, this bias does not significantly impact the likelihood of sustaining cooperation for punitive strategies (e.g., the grim trigger).