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<p>There appears to be an epistemic gap between the personal and the impersonal. The apparent epistemic gap presents a challenge to reductionist views about personal identity according to which facts about personal identity are grounded in impersonal facts about physical and/or psychological continuity. I discuss and reject two strategies of trying to close the apparent epistemic gap, a phenomenalist and a Cartesian one. I then develop and motivate an alternative account based on the special perspectival character of inside imagination. The imagination-based account explains why there seems to be an epistemic gap between the personal and the impersonal and at the same time avoids a corresponding ontological gap.</p>

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The epistemic gap between the personal and the impersonal

  • 期刊论文

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月10日

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  • Clas Weber

摘要

There appears to be an epistemic gap between the personal and the impersonal. The apparent epistemic gap presents a challenge to reductionist views about personal identity according to which facts about personal identity are grounded in impersonal facts about physical and/or psychological continuity. I discuss and reject two strategies of trying to close the apparent epistemic gap, a phenomenalist and a Cartesian one. I then develop and motivate an alternative account based on the special perspectival character of inside imagination. The imagination-based account explains why there seems to be an epistemic gap between the personal and the impersonal and at the same time avoids a corresponding ontological gap.