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<p>Jun Otsuka’s trialist ontology posits the causal model as a third-layer entity representing inter-world laws. This paper challenges Otsuka’s framework by focusing on a key yet overlooked element, abductive reasoning in Pearl’s three-step model of counterfactuals. We argue that a third-layer entity is sufficient for interventions, but cannot account for abduction. Handling abduction, which involves updating the law itself based on evidence, requires a fourth-layer entity—a meta- inter-world law—embodied by the full Structural Causal Model. However, rather than advocating for this new ontological layer, we use its necessity to perform a reductio ad absurdum against this project. By highlighting the principled inferential gap between probabilistic and causal layers, we ultimately defend a modest two-layer ontology, viewing higher-level models as powerful epistemological constructs rather than metaphysical realities.</p>

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Beyond trialist ontology: a sketch of causal modeling hierarchy

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月2日

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  • Fan Zhu

摘要

Jun Otsuka’s trialist ontology posits the causal model as a third-layer entity representing inter-world laws. This paper challenges Otsuka’s framework by focusing on a key yet overlooked element, abductive reasoning in Pearl’s three-step model of counterfactuals. We argue that a third-layer entity is sufficient for interventions, but cannot account for abduction. Handling abduction, which involves updating the law itself based on evidence, requires a fourth-layer entity—a meta- inter-world law—embodied by the full Structural Causal Model. However, rather than advocating for this new ontological layer, we use its necessity to perform a reductio ad absurdum against this project. By highlighting the principled inferential gap between probabilistic and causal layers, we ultimately defend a modest two-layer ontology, viewing higher-level models as powerful epistemological constructs rather than metaphysical realities.