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<p>The aim of this paper is to motivate and defend Evidential Knowledge First, a view that combines the best of both knowledge first and evidentialist approaches to epistemology. To do so, I argue that knowledge is not the most general factive mental state. However, non-inferential knowledge is. After developing the core commitments of the view, I investigate what else the Evidential Knowledge Firster should say. A similar view is considered and rejected by Alexander Bird (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2025</CitationRef>). I conclude by addressing his objections.</p>

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Evidential knowledge first

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月26日

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  • Giada Fratantonio

摘要

The aim of this paper is to motivate and defend Evidential Knowledge First, a view that combines the best of both knowledge first and evidentialist approaches to epistemology. To do so, I argue that knowledge is not the most general factive mental state. However, non-inferential knowledge is. After developing the core commitments of the view, I investigate what else the Evidential Knowledge Firster should say. A similar view is considered and rejected by Alexander Bird (2025). I conclude by addressing his objections.