<p>This paper discusses the phenomenon of strategic track-record building in the context of Expert Identification. I present three mathematical models to show (1) track records do improve Novice’s epistemic performance as Goldman (2001, 2021) suggested, (2) Expert can influence Novice’s decision by strategically building track records even when Novice has full information about Expert’s track record, and (3) these influences can only be overcome by regulations at the institutional level. This enriches the existing literature on Expert Identification in two ways. First, it fills a gap in the existing literature on the strategic aspects of track-record building, despite its ubiquitous presence. Second, as the identified caveat can only be overcome via institutional arrangements, it shows that the Expert Identification problem is a problem of so-called “system-oriented social epistemology” even in the one-Expert-one-Novice setting, <i>contra</i> Goldman (2012), who treats it as a paradigmatic example of the study of a single doxastic agent with social evidence.</p>