<p>No-lose arguments state that—no matter what the result of an experiment will be—there will be a relevant epistemic gain if the experiment is performed. Here I provide an analysis of such arguments, looking at examples from particle physics. I argue that no-lose arguments indicate the pursuitworthiness of experiments by partially decoupling the expected epistemic gain of an experiment from the ex-ante probability that the primarily intended outcome is achieved. While an experiment’s pursuitworthiness typically depends on the ex-ante probability that the intended outcome is realized, this is not the case if there is a no-lose argument in place. I argue that this works insofar as (1) the argument’s win condition is attainable with reasonable effort, (2) the argument’s underlying assumptions are plausible, and (3) the potential experimental outcomes covered by the argument are all epistemically relevant. I also explore the consequences of no-lose arguments for considerations of scientific pursuitworthiness. First, no-lose arguments can play an important role in assessing the risk associated with investing into a research project. Second, no-lose arguments can enhance scientists’ agreement about the pursuitworthiness of experiments. My analysis also shows that no-lose arguments can face a number of limitations in these contexts.</p>