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<p>This article develops a new construal of continuity theories of personal identity. On this construal, continuity theories are understood as theories of the real definition of personhood—of <i>what it is to be a person</i>: to be a person just is to be <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(X\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-continuous (e.g., psychologically continuous) with oneself and only oneself. This construal is motivated by two familiar challenges to the psychological theory: the modal coincidence objection and the unanalyzability objection. This article concludes by examining the implications of this account and considering potential revisions to it.</p>

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Continuity theories reimagined

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月28日

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  • Ho-yeung Lee

摘要

This article develops a new construal of continuity theories of personal identity. On this construal, continuity theories are understood as theories of the real definition of personhood—of what it is to be a person: to be a person just is to be \(X\) -continuous (e.g., psychologically continuous) with oneself and only oneself. This construal is motivated by two familiar challenges to the psychological theory: the modal coincidence objection and the unanalyzability objection. This article concludes by examining the implications of this account and considering potential revisions to it.