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<p>Taking a discussion of Soames’s argument to the effect that semantic contents cannot be identified with sets of truth-supporting circumstances as a starting point we develop a novel semantics for propositional attitude contexts, and more specifically for belief-reports, that implements contextualist ideas within the framework of possible world semantics.</p>

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Doxastic semantics and ways of believing

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月19日

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  • Johannes Stern

摘要

Taking a discussion of Soames’s argument to the effect that semantic contents cannot be identified with sets of truth-supporting circumstances as a starting point we develop a novel semantics for propositional attitude contexts, and more specifically for belief-reports, that implements contextualist ideas within the framework of possible world semantics.