Section 1 of the paper presents the following argument: Premise 1) There is a phenomenology of ownership of experiences. Premise 2) If there is such a phenomenology, then the self exists. Conclusion: the self exists. The rest of the paper discusses Chadha’s (2017; 2023, 142–159) proposed response to this argument: denying Premise 1. Section 2 sets out Chadha’s reply, while Sects. 3 and 4 consider two objections to it. The first objection is unsuccessful, but the second is fatal. Section 5 examines and critiques a natural way of modifying Chadha’s strategy to make it effective. Section 6 shows that certain elements of Chadha’s approach lead us to conclude that it is Premise 2 that should be rejected, rather than Premise 1. Section 7 then argues that denying Premise 2 is a viable option supported by classical Buddhist philosophy and contemporary Buddhist scholarship.
