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<p>Modal neo-conventionalism accounts for metaphysical modality in terms of conceptual rules. Many modern neo-conventionalists have tried, in their own anti-metaphysical ways, to account for, rather than deny, important “metaphysical phenomena”, such as <i>a posteriori</i> necessity (Sidelle 1989, Thomasson 2020, Warren 2022a), <i>de re</i> modality (Povich 2024a,b, 2025, Sidelle 1989, Thomasson 2020), essence (Locke 2020, Locke and Thomasson 2023), grounding (Locke 2020), and counterpossibles (Locke 2021). In this paper, I aim to do the same for haecceitistic possibilities.</p>

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Neo-conventionalism and the imaginative origin of haecceitistic intuitions

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月28日

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  • Mark Povich

摘要

Modal neo-conventionalism accounts for metaphysical modality in terms of conceptual rules. Many modern neo-conventionalists have tried, in their own anti-metaphysical ways, to account for, rather than deny, important “metaphysical phenomena”, such as a posteriori necessity (Sidelle 1989, Thomasson 2020, Warren 2022a), de re modality (Povich 2024a,b, 2025, Sidelle 1989, Thomasson 2020), essence (Locke 2020, Locke and Thomasson 2023), grounding (Locke 2020), and counterpossibles (Locke 2021). In this paper, I aim to do the same for haecceitistic possibilities.