<p>This article underscores the significance of epistemic desires in the context of pragmatic arguments for God’s existence inspired by Pascal’s Wager. Their role has often been underestimated due to the dominance of the hedonistic conception of utility. Yet within a traditional theological framework there is a crucial asymmetry between theist and atheist with respect to such desires: if God exists, the atheist corrects their earthly error after death; by contrast, in a world without God, the theist lives and dies while holding a false belief on one of the most fundamental questions—the existence of God—with no opportunity for correction. This asymmetry, I contend, should weigh especially heavily for the philosopher. Drawing on decision theory and the expected utility principle, the paper argues that once outdated theological assumptions are set aside, this consideration supports atheism in a wager modeled on Pascal’s. Thus, atheism need not be grounded in the pursuit of an immoral life but may instead rest on noble epistemic aspirations—desires many of us share, and whose possession appears to be a necessary condition for being, in the normative sense, a philosopher.</p>