<p>A proposition can be false but still true about a certain subject matter: e.g., the proposition that snow is white and expensive is false, yet still true about the color of snow. This paper investigates how this idea of ‘truth about a subject matter’ should be analyzed. I begin with the Simple Conjunction Theory, which explains the case by decomposing a false proposition into a true conjunct about the subject matter and a false conjunct irrelevant to it. While intuitive, this theory fails to account for non-conjunctive propositions. I then examine the Lewis-Yablo Theory, which invokes possible-world partitions to analyze subject matters. I show that this framework generalizes the Simple Conjunction Theory and accommodates non-conjunctive cases, but it also faces a counterexample. To resolve this, I propose modifications based on closeness relations among possible worlds. The resulting account preserves the explanatory motivations of the earlier theories while avoiding their difficulties.</p>