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<p>In this paper, we argue against two prominent ways of thinking about the ontology of delusions: delusionality as marked by mistaken reasoning, and delusionality as marked by empathic unintelligibility. Rather than offering a competing definition of delusions as such, we provide a Wittgensteinian analysis according to which delusions are voiced in the form of utterances that cannot be evidentially justified, and clash with <i>hinges</i> accordingly. Hinges are here considered grammatical rules that allow us to justify our knowledge claims. Delusional utterances conflict with these grammatical rules and are <i>ungrammatical</i> with respect to them. We will argue that the ungrammaticality of delusional utterances can account for both the intuitive appeal of a DSM-style definition in terms of false, unjustified and incorrigible beliefs, as well as its conceptual inadequacy. Similarly, this ungrammaticality accounts for both the intuitive appeal as well as the conceptual inadequacy of taking delusional utterances to be marked by the impossibility of others finding them empathically intelligible. It will be argued that traditional features such as lack of justification, imperviousness to counterarguments, and falsity are better considered to stem from, rather than to define, delusionality. It will be concluded that a further analysis of delusional utterances offers a way to positively define delusionality.</p>

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Delusional utterances

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月12日

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  • Rick Bellaar,
  • Jasper Feyaerts

摘要

In this paper, we argue against two prominent ways of thinking about the ontology of delusions: delusionality as marked by mistaken reasoning, and delusionality as marked by empathic unintelligibility. Rather than offering a competing definition of delusions as such, we provide a Wittgensteinian analysis according to which delusions are voiced in the form of utterances that cannot be evidentially justified, and clash with hinges accordingly. Hinges are here considered grammatical rules that allow us to justify our knowledge claims. Delusional utterances conflict with these grammatical rules and are ungrammatical with respect to them. We will argue that the ungrammaticality of delusional utterances can account for both the intuitive appeal of a DSM-style definition in terms of false, unjustified and incorrigible beliefs, as well as its conceptual inadequacy. Similarly, this ungrammaticality accounts for both the intuitive appeal as well as the conceptual inadequacy of taking delusional utterances to be marked by the impossibility of others finding them empathically intelligible. It will be argued that traditional features such as lack of justification, imperviousness to counterarguments, and falsity are better considered to stem from, rather than to define, delusionality. It will be concluded that a further analysis of delusional utterances offers a way to positively define delusionality.