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<p>The flow state has historically been a source of mystery and, at times, mysticism. Whereas some accounts of flow allude to the flowing individual’s conscious absorption and focus, others imply that the individual is, in fact, not conscious. If we take this latter model seriously, our intuition that those in flow ought to be creditable for their acts becomes deeply threatened. However, there is good reason to believe that this mindless account of flow is wrong. Recent work in theoretical cognitive science suggests that flow is an exhibition of bodily minded skill in which consciousness plays a central part. Although this account might salvage more creditability for the minded flowing individual than their mindless counterpart, under a recent axiological framework, it remains ambiguous just how creditable such minded individuals emerge, insofar as the taxonomy fails to cover the role played by subdoxastic intentions and desires in skilful activity. We thus propose a refinement of the framework, which accounts for how these flowing individuals <i>are</i> just as intentional, agentive, skilful, and thus creditable as any non-flowing counterpart who achieves the same material outcome.</p>

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Bodily minded skill: active inference, flowing individuals, and the credit we owe them

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月12日

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  • Darius Parvizi-Wayne,
  • Thomas Montefiore

摘要

The flow state has historically been a source of mystery and, at times, mysticism. Whereas some accounts of flow allude to the flowing individual’s conscious absorption and focus, others imply that the individual is, in fact, not conscious. If we take this latter model seriously, our intuition that those in flow ought to be creditable for their acts becomes deeply threatened. However, there is good reason to believe that this mindless account of flow is wrong. Recent work in theoretical cognitive science suggests that flow is an exhibition of bodily minded skill in which consciousness plays a central part. Although this account might salvage more creditability for the minded flowing individual than their mindless counterpart, under a recent axiological framework, it remains ambiguous just how creditable such minded individuals emerge, insofar as the taxonomy fails to cover the role played by subdoxastic intentions and desires in skilful activity. We thus propose a refinement of the framework, which accounts for how these flowing individuals are just as intentional, agentive, skilful, and thus creditable as any non-flowing counterpart who achieves the same material outcome.