<p>There has been a recent explosion of work on Kant’s account of the particular laws of nature, framing the interpretive and philosophical issues by distinguishing two classic approaches to Kant and a third, new approach—often called a “necessitation account” (NA). But the third way has attracted divergent glosses, sometimes seemingly in tension: in terms of essences, kinds, or pure powers, etc. I argue that, for any third way to be both distinct and viable, it must give a non-epistemic account of particular laws in terms of necessitation, itself accounted for in terms of (i) dependence on or governance by (ii) something general, or instantiable with an essence. I defend this NA against outstanding worries: it can be textually grounded, need not appeal to noumena, and can address Kant’s claim that particular laws “stand under” general laws of nature. I then argue for a reconfiguration of recent debate about the implications of NA. The third way was first tied to an epistemic restriction, which I defend and clarify in this way: for conclusions about what is and is not a particular law of nature, we generally lack (outside a special kind of case) the right kind of grounds—epistemic grounds bearing directly on truth irrespective of aims or ends. Recent attempts to defend a third way while rejecting this restriction fail. Instead, they require a hidden return to the best system interpretation. Debate should split, then, between an epistemically restricted third way and an openly renewed best system interpretation.</p>