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<p>The correct account of communication, it is widely held, must accommodate the kind of case presented by Brian Loar (Philos Stud 30(6): 353-377, 1976) in which subjects misunderstand each other despite referring to the same entity. Epistemic Russellianism (ER) has emerged as a strong new candidate to accomplish this task. Claiming that the significance of Loar’s puzzle is due to an element of luck, as in Gettier’s (Analysis 23(6): 121-123, 1963) cases, ER concludes that communication requires knowledge of co-reference, and not a match in Fregean sense or mode of presentation. My aim is twofold. Firstly, I deploy some defensive moves against recent ER-based attacks on a Fregean approach to communication. Secondly, as an offensive manoeuvre, I argue that ER’s knowledge-based view faces the problem posed by cases of lucky communication. These cases show that drawing a knowledge-of-co-reference condition on communication is unwarranted. The upshot of my discussion is that the Fregean approach is still the stronger contender of the two.</p>

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Talk about luck! On the role of knowledge in communication

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月12日

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  • Valentine Simpson

摘要

The correct account of communication, it is widely held, must accommodate the kind of case presented by Brian Loar (Philos Stud 30(6): 353-377, 1976) in which subjects misunderstand each other despite referring to the same entity. Epistemic Russellianism (ER) has emerged as a strong new candidate to accomplish this task. Claiming that the significance of Loar’s puzzle is due to an element of luck, as in Gettier’s (Analysis 23(6): 121-123, 1963) cases, ER concludes that communication requires knowledge of co-reference, and not a match in Fregean sense or mode of presentation. My aim is twofold. Firstly, I deploy some defensive moves against recent ER-based attacks on a Fregean approach to communication. Secondly, as an offensive manoeuvre, I argue that ER’s knowledge-based view faces the problem posed by cases of lucky communication. These cases show that drawing a knowledge-of-co-reference condition on communication is unwarranted. The upshot of my discussion is that the Fregean approach is still the stronger contender of the two.