<p>To explain intentional bodily action, we must address the Interface Problem: how propositional intentions and non-propositional motor representations integrate non-accidentally. Two requirements arise: matching, ensuring a motor representation corresponds to an intention despite format differences, and selection, choosing one motor representation among multiple matches. We combine Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces with Bayesian inference to meet both requirements.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Solving the interface problem: from intentions to motor representations through conceptual spaces

  • Peter Brössel,
  • Eline Kuipers

摘要

To explain intentional bodily action, we must address the Interface Problem: how propositional intentions and non-propositional motor representations integrate non-accidentally. Two requirements arise: matching, ensuring a motor representation corresponds to an intention despite format differences, and selection, choosing one motor representation among multiple matches. We combine Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces with Bayesian inference to meet both requirements.