<p>Unificationism is a theory of explanation that is founded on the principle that we should explain everything with as little as possible. Unificationism accepts that we gain knowledge when we learn of a previously unknown phenomenon, or learn how to explain what we could not explain before, and adds that we gain understanding when we learn how to explain all phenomena with fewer laws or brute facts. One criticism unificationism faces is that it leads to unacceptable results when knowledge is limited. This objection is important because our knowledge is limited, and we need a philosophy of science that works for us. In this paper, I develop unificationism to defend it from such objections. In doing so, I make proposals concerning the nature of universal statements, provisional explanations, and how to measure variety of explanans and explananda, that I argue are well-motivated by unificationism’s fundamental principles. Additionally, I argue that the assumptions of the view and its potential weaknesses are acceptable in a philosophy for us in our world.</p>