In the article, I discuss a form of semantic variance in singular terms and concepts that has been largely overlooked in current debates. I call this phenomenon aboutness-fragility: according to certain theories of reference that allow for reference failure, a singular thought \( <\alpha \text{ is } \Phi> \) (or its verbal report ‘ \(\alpha \text{ is } \Phi\) ’) formed by uptaking some selected informational stream may refer to an object in the actual circumstance of thought formation, yet fail to do so in nearby scenarios where the informational stream remains unchanged. I identify some theories which are open to aboutness-fragility, and examine its implications. In particular, I argue that any theory allowing aboutness-fragility must be revised to prevent it, since the phenomenon disrupts the tight connection between reference, knowledge-transmission, and communication. To offer a case study, I focus on Imogen Dickie’s theory of reference for proper names Dickie (Fixing Reference, 2015), which holds that proper-name aboutness-relations are context-sensitive and depend on an agent’s contextually variable activity of filtering information. In this regard, I show that, when this context sensitivity is pushed to its limits, it yields aboutness-fragility. I conclude that Dickie’s account—like any theory open to this phenomenon—requires revision.
