<p>Of late, Kant scholars have been looking to contemporary discussions of laws of nature and dispositions to better understand Kant’s account of laws and causal powers. Indeed, according to a recent interpretive trend, set in motion by pioneering work of Eric Watkins and Jim Kreines, Kant’s account of laws is a version of dispositionalism. However, there is room for controversy about which version of dispositionalism Kant embraces and, relatedly, which contemporary figures provide the best models for understanding Kant’s account. Some recent proponents of the dispositionalist reading have ascribed to Kant a version of natural kind essentialism along the lines of Brian Ellis, while more recently Kristina Engelhard has argued that Kant’s account of laws is instead a “pure dispositionalist view”—that is, a view more like Alexander Bird’s. I defend the view that Kant, in both the pre-Critical and Critical period, embraces a version of natural kind essentialism along the lines of Ellis’s. I highlight a number of parallels. I also show how an understanding of the debate between Ellis and Bird can assist us in appreciating the philosophical strengths, weaknesses, and implications of Kant’s natural kind essentialism.</p>