<p>I propose and defend a novel conception of transformative decisions, according to which an agent has partial awareness before the decision is made and which, once made, casts a lingering shadow in their mind. I construct this definition from the ground up as I gradually define key terms such as ‘epistemic access’ and ‘awareness’ that are central to my framework while framing them within the ongoing dialogue. This redefinition strikes a balance between L.A. Paul’s foundational definition and Richard Pettigrew’s decision-theoretic objections by drawing inspiration from Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s precursory work in decision theory. I argue that this definition sufficiently replies to Tim Campbell and Julia Mosquera’s “shark problem” and adequately excludes situations with arbitrary choice. I also put forward examples to defend my arguments and more importantly, to highlight conceptual gaps in the existing literature. In doing so, I broadly advocate for epistemic humility and reiterate the complexity of subjective, core-defining decisions.</p>