<p>When we violate an epistemic norm, we may be subject to an epistemic analogue of blame, unless we have a defense against it. In this paper, I offer a novel account of such defenses, in particular of the difference between having epistemic justification and having an epistemic excuse, and apply it to the debate between factivism and nonfactivism about justification. I draw on work in ethics and law to argue that having an excuse, in general, does not require manifesting excellence or virtue, but only meeting reasonable expectations of being responsive to reasons against wrongdoing in spite of acting against them. It is thus a neutral rather than positive status. In the epistemic case, we have an excuse roughly when in spite of violating an epistemic norm, our response manifested the kind of regard for epistemic value and sensitivity to epistemic support relations that it was reasonable to expect of us. When it comes to justification, I argue that it is important to distinguish between vindications that show that there is nothing wrong with one’s response and (mere) justifications that show that one’s response is all-things-considered permissible and called for in the circumstances, but is nevertheless prima facie wrong and regrettable (like killing in self-defense). If we apply this to the epistemological debate, we can see that contrary to factivist claims, epistemically excellent false beliefs are not merely excused but justified in virtue of being called for in the circumstances, though they are not epistemically ideal.</p>