<p>There is much debate about whether philosophy makes progress and if yes, how much. Dellsén, Lawler, and Norton have recently argued that any sensible discussion about this must presuppose some definition of philosophical progress. I do not dispute that this is one possible approach, but in this paper, I offer an alternative and argue that it is viable and promising. We can distinguish two questions about progress in philosophy: one can ask whether philosophy achieves results of the kind that science aims to achieve, scientific progress, or one can ask whether philosophy achieves results of a kind that science does <i>not</i> aim to achieve, philosophical but not scientific progress. Much of the debate, I propose, focuses on the former question, which we can largely address without producing an account of philosophical, or indeed scientific progress. We can empirically evaluate whether philosophy displays the markers associated with scientific progress in <i>all</i> the existing accounts of scientific progress irrespective of which account is correct. This can settle empirical questions about the comparison between philosophy and science even if we do not have a consensus about the analysis of philosophical and scientific progress and on whether philosophy aims at results of a kind that science does not.</p>