Scholarlink

<p>The Mohist concept of <i>xinshen</i> (信身) is reinterpreted here within the framework of contemporary AI ethics. In the <i>Mozi</i> (墨子), the term <i>xinshen</i> appears exclusively in <i>Exalting Unity III</i> (尚同下) and is absent from all other pre-Qin texts. While it has traditionally been rendered as “integrity,” “self-confidence,” or “belief in others,” this article argues that <i>xinshen</i> should be understood as a dual structure: the delegation of perception and action to trusted agents, and the extension of one’s moral virtues through them. This reconceptualization reframes trust not as passive belief but as ethically guided reliance. When applied to human-AI relations, it reveals that although current AI systems substantially extend human cognition, they lack the trustworthiness and moral agency required to meet the ethical expectations embodied in <i>xinshen</i>. Moreover, the commercial logics underlying AI development frequently prioritize profit over public welfare, thereby contravening the Mohist principle that genuine benefit must be grounded in righteousness. Recasting <i>xinshen</i> as a normative ideal of ethically conditioned reliance thus offers a distinctive contribution to AI ethics: it shifts attention from individual belief or technical remediation to the moral foundations of institutional design and decision-making. Ultimately, <i>xinshen</i> is proposed not as a descriptive account of what AI currently is, but as an ethical orientation for what it ought to become—a framework for cultivating trustworthy, virtue-aligned, and socially responsible intelligent systems.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Xinshen and the ethics of belief in human-AI relations: a Mozi-inspired ethical reinterpretation

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月12日

查看全文
  • Wing-yin Pang

摘要

The Mohist concept of xinshen (信身) is reinterpreted here within the framework of contemporary AI ethics. In the Mozi (墨子), the term xinshen appears exclusively in Exalting Unity III (尚同下) and is absent from all other pre-Qin texts. While it has traditionally been rendered as “integrity,” “self-confidence,” or “belief in others,” this article argues that xinshen should be understood as a dual structure: the delegation of perception and action to trusted agents, and the extension of one’s moral virtues through them. This reconceptualization reframes trust not as passive belief but as ethically guided reliance. When applied to human-AI relations, it reveals that although current AI systems substantially extend human cognition, they lack the trustworthiness and moral agency required to meet the ethical expectations embodied in xinshen. Moreover, the commercial logics underlying AI development frequently prioritize profit over public welfare, thereby contravening the Mohist principle that genuine benefit must be grounded in righteousness. Recasting xinshen as a normative ideal of ethically conditioned reliance thus offers a distinctive contribution to AI ethics: it shifts attention from individual belief or technical remediation to the moral foundations of institutional design and decision-making. Ultimately, xinshen is proposed not as a descriptive account of what AI currently is, but as an ethical orientation for what it ought to become—a framework for cultivating trustworthy, virtue-aligned, and socially responsible intelligent systems.