<p>I feel fear of the Great Dane in front of me. I am envious of my colleague’s publication list. I feel admiration for activists at a human-rights demonstration. My fear, envy and admiration are unique experiences in themselves and unique ways in which I experience the Great Dane, the publication list, and the activists, as fearsome, enviable and admirable (respectively). This raises two questions: how are emotions related to our ability to conceive of emotions themselves and of evaluative properties? In this paper, I present my attempts to answer both questions. I argue that feeling an emotion is necessary for one to be able to conceive of the emotion and to acquire emotion concepts. I also argue that emotions are the basic way we conceive of evaluative properties. This novel metasemantic and epistemic account has implications for our view of concepts of evaluative properties and the way we can acquire them. Most importantly, it brings forth a necessary explanatory role that emotions play in fixing our reference to evaluative properties, acquiring concepts of these properties and forming beliefs about them. The account provides crucial groundwork for establishing emotions’ epistemic role.</p>