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<p>This paper evaluates logical nihilism as a response to counterexamples to logical laws. Drawing on Imre Lakatos’ taxonomy of methodologies for responding to counterexamples and contra Gillian Russell’s interpretation of it in the context of logical research, this paper argues that there is no single best method of dealing with logical counterexamples. There is no uniform answer to the questions of whether we should revise a theorem in the face of a counterexample and how we revise. This paper then goes on to recommend separating logical nihilism as a factual claim about the number of correct logics from a defeatist methodology in the face of salient counterexamples to logical laws, thus arguing that nihilism is in fact reconcilable with a positive research attitude towards logic.</p>

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Logical nihilism and dealing with counterexamples in logic with proofs and refutations

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月12日

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  • Ruigang Xu

摘要

This paper evaluates logical nihilism as a response to counterexamples to logical laws. Drawing on Imre Lakatos’ taxonomy of methodologies for responding to counterexamples and contra Gillian Russell’s interpretation of it in the context of logical research, this paper argues that there is no single best method of dealing with logical counterexamples. There is no uniform answer to the questions of whether we should revise a theorem in the face of a counterexample and how we revise. This paper then goes on to recommend separating logical nihilism as a factual claim about the number of correct logics from a defeatist methodology in the face of salient counterexamples to logical laws, thus arguing that nihilism is in fact reconcilable with a positive research attitude towards logic.