<p>Against the background of several methodological problems that analytic philosophy has struggled with since the beginning of the new millennium, conceptual engineering has emerged as a promising philosophical methodology. Recently, however, this methodology has faced its own challenges. In this paper, we develop a new response to one of these challenges, specifically, the challenge of identifying the object of the process of conceptual engineering. Our main claim is that (weak) non-conceptual content is an object of conceptual engineering that has not received sufficient attention in the literature. This claim strengthens the position of philosophers who argue that the object of conceptual engineering can be something other than concepts. The key to supporting this claim is the idea that conceptual innovation is part of conceptual engineering. We argue for the main claim through hypothetical cases, and additionally with several examples from the history of philosophy, seeking to show that this type of conceptual engineering is relevant to philosophical methodology. Our claim also leads to an important consequence: namely, that conceptual engineering sometimes requires an initial stage of what we call experience engineering. This initial stage consists of directly or indirectly acquiring sufficiently rich experiential (non-conceptual) content of what is supposed to be engineered. We show how conceptual engineering can benefit from experience engineering by discussing three domains of philosophical investigation.</p>