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<p>A large body of empirical work suggests that we form our political beliefs through <i>social referencing—</i>looking to others within our social group for cues as to what to believe. When our social identities become political identities, we conform our political beliefs to the members of our ingroup. Consequently, our belief forming processes are influenced by conformist bias (believing what our peers believe) and prestige bias (adopting the beliefs of high-status members of our communities). <i>Prima facie</i>, this is epistemically worrying because cognitive bias is not a safe path to knowledge. However, it has been recently argued that such social referencing is both rational and reliable—in fact, given our epistemic interconnectedness, much of our knowledge is acquired this way. Here we argue that this strategy fails to vindicate our political beliefs. The processes that produce our political beliefs fail to meet conditions that are plausibly necessary for knowledge.</p>

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Socially distributed ignorance

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月5日

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  • Gordon Barnes,
  • Hrishikesh Joshi

摘要

A large body of empirical work suggests that we form our political beliefs through social referencing—looking to others within our social group for cues as to what to believe. When our social identities become political identities, we conform our political beliefs to the members of our ingroup. Consequently, our belief forming processes are influenced by conformist bias (believing what our peers believe) and prestige bias (adopting the beliefs of high-status members of our communities). Prima facie, this is epistemically worrying because cognitive bias is not a safe path to knowledge. However, it has been recently argued that such social referencing is both rational and reliable—in fact, given our epistemic interconnectedness, much of our knowledge is acquired this way. Here we argue that this strategy fails to vindicate our political beliefs. The processes that produce our political beliefs fail to meet conditions that are plausibly necessary for knowledge.